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Abstract 
In Japan, economic stagnation due to the lack of aggregate demand has hit the regional 
health insurance system and this affects most retired pensioners. The fiscal state of insurers 
in rural areas deteriorated. This paper aims to investigate whether the regional disparities 
in medical levies per household make a contribution  to income-related geographic 
inequalities in health care financing.  Data  of  the central two regions of the Japanese 
National Health Insurance in 2005 were extracted. Their share of population was about 41.5 
percent. Retired employees and self-employed individuals are covered by this insurance 
system.  
We conducted the geographic decomposition using the concentration index. The 
within-area inequality in medical levies mainly accounted for geographic  inequality in 
medical levies per household. The hypothesis that there was no between-area inequality in 
medical levies was not rejected. We revealed the differences in the within-area inequality in 
medical levies in the central Kanto. This means such proportionality was not built into the 
NHI system through near constant contribution rates across the distribution of living 
standards.  It can be considered that the differences in the within-area inequality were 
caused by the inequality in income per household and the multiplier of income levies. 
We found that income per household, the standard land price of residential districts and 
the size of an insurer are major determinants of the multiplier of income levies. The higher 
land price tends to greater the multiplier of income levies. The expansion of insurer’s size 
increases the multiplier of income levies in most of districts. The inequality in the multiplier 
of income levies will reduce if local governments raise per-household levy in proportion to 
the size of an insurer and lower the multiplier of income levy.  
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1 Introduction 
Japan has an advanced social insurance system covering the entire population 
and family allowances for old age, for disabilities, sickness and maternity, work 
injuries, and unemployment (USDHH 2000). But, because of tightening budgetary 
constraints, benefits are likely to be reduced even as contributions rise. Total 
government debt was 170 percent of GDP at the end of 2008. This is the highest in 
the industrialized world, and twice what it was twelve years ago. Unless fiscal 
policy is tightened this ratio could rise to 200 percent by the end of 2010. 1
                                                             
1  The Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW 2000) reported gloomy prospects for the social security 
system. Social security pay-outs by the government will nearly triple by fiscal 2025 to 207 trillion yen 
based on the projected rate of benefit growth of the past decade. The ministry calculated that the 
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National health care expenditures (NHE) accounted for about 9.11 percent of 
national income (NI) in 2007. The rise in this ratio during the decade raised 
concerns that health care costs were out of control. After 1991 the Japanese 
economy declined sharply, while NHE increased at an annual rate of 4.9 percent 
compared to 0.46 percent for NI for the period 1990-1999. From 1987 to 1991, NHE 
grew at about the same rate as NI, so the ratio of NHE to NI remained below 6.5 
percent. 
Ikegami and Campbell (2004) pointed out that economic stagnation has hit the 
National Health Insurance (NHI) system, which covers most retired pensioners, in 
two ways. 2
 
  First,  declining incomes have meant that worker’s premium 
contribution rates have had to be raised. Second, the fiscal state of NHI has become 
even more precarious as laid-off workers with low incomes have enrolled and as 
more people have been unable to pay premiums. For NHI, it is well known that the 
premium in the most expensive municipality is five times that of the least expensive 
municipality. The distribution of income and health can be altered by changing 
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Figure 1. Trends in National Income and National Health Care Expenditures 
 
Previous studies have shown horizontal inequity in health care utilization in 
Japan (Endo and Shinozaki 2003, Ohkusa and Honda 2003, Kumagai 2007, 
O’Donnell et al. 2008).3
                                                                                                                                                                                   
consumption tax of 5 percent would have to be increased to 25-41 percent to cover the 100 trillion yen 
needed for basic benefits a quarter century down the road. 
  O’Donnell et al. (2008) estimated the Kakwani indices of 13 
Asian territories and concluded that social insurance is slightly regressive and 
direct payments are regressive. Their results for Japan were derived from the 1998 
Comprehensive Survey of Living Conditions, which covered the whole population. 
2  They paraphrased NHI as Citizens’ Health Insurance.  
3  Kumagai (2007) found that the municipal subsidy showed almost horizontal equity for inpatients 
with a cerebrovascular disease. Based on estimation results of censored regression, Kumagai (2007) 
concluded that municipalities can gain hospital revenues by raising the utilization of beds slightly and 
then reduce the municipal subsidy. - 3 - 
 
However, they did not analyze disparities in the Japanese regional health insurance 
system.   
It is believed that wealthier is healthier. But, are the distributions of medical 
levies to health insurers proportional to the insured’s health? A purpose of this 
study is to examine the regional disparities in medical levies to health insurers 
contributing to income-related inequalities in health care financing.  Previous 
studies have not revealed the extent of within-area income-related inequality in 
medical levies. This paper presents the first research to investigate the 
characteristics of Japanese National Health Insurance from the viewpoint of 
geographic inequality in health care financing. The structure of this paper is as 
follows. In Section 2, Japanese health insurance system is briefly summarized and 
recent changes to premium rates set that reflect differences in health care 
expenditures among prefectures are shown. Section 3 presents empirical results 
using  concentration index. We  analyze  the  determinants of the inequality in 
medical levies per household  and consider local government’s  health policy  to 
reduce income-related inequality in health care financing. Section 4 offers a 
conclusion.   
 
2 Health Care Financing and Health Insurance System in Japan 
Japan has a policy of universal health care and Japanese public health 
insurance covers the entire population. The compulsory health insurance system 
with income-based premiums has been universal since 1961 and is organized on an 
occupational-based system or regional-based (municipality-based) system. Social 
insurance schemes and taxation constitute the main sources of health funding in 
Japan. Approximately half of the NHE are financed by health insurance plans and 
the remainders are financed by subsidies from the government, co-payments, and 
other out-of-pocket expenses (See Figure 2 and Table 1). Medical services in Japan 
can be accessed freely and patients can visit medical institutions of their choice at 
any time. Payments for medical treatment are based on the medical and technical 
service fee.4  Reimbursements to health care providers are uniform across regions 
with little concern for differences in type of facility or severity of illness because the 
government sets the fee schedule and drug prices. Many people in Japan obtain 
insurance via employer-related groups. For example, employees of large companies 
and their dependent family members enroll in plans for which occupation-based 
cooperatives  are the insurers. Insurance societies or mutual aid societies are 
established within industries. Most employer-group plans require copayments for 
dependents. These plans also have a catastrophic cap feature that limits monthly 
out-of-pocket expenses.5
                                                             
4  The fee schedule is decided through key biennial negotiations between insures and providers, and 
that forum －the Central Social Insurance Medical Care Council (Chuikyo) －  has provided a 
mechanism for dealing with many recurring issues in a routinized way with very restricted 
participation. Proof of insurance is submitted when receiving health care and medical compensation is 
decided after the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare consults with the Chuikyo. 
  Japanese public health insurance systems are classified 
roughly into [1] insurance for employees and their dependents, [2] insurance for the 
self-employed, retirees and their dependents, and [3] insurance for the elderly.   
5  When the monthly out-of-pocket amount was higher than the ceiling, the excess amount was paid 
back to the patient from insurance funds. A ceiling on patient cost-sharing was introduced for the first 
time in 1973. - 4 - 
 
The first type of insurance is Employee’s Health Insurance, which consists of 
Government-managed Health Insurance (GHI), Society-managed Health Insurance 
(SHI), Mutual Aid Associations (MAA), and Seamen’s Insurance (SI). MAA includes 
national and local public employees, and private school teachers and staff members. 
Self-employed individuals, farmers, and retired employees enroll  in National 
Health Insurance (NHI) for which municipalities are the insurers. In general, an 
employee and his/her dependents are covered by a regional-based system after 
his/her retirement. The system is not an independent health insurance system for 
the retirees but is a financial support system for physician visits with small 
copayments at the time of a medical service is provided. Employees' Insurance 
contributes to NHI to cover retired employees. For most NHI insurers, the premium 
is supplemented by subsidies from national and local governments. 
 
[2] Provision of Health Services
[3] Patient cost-sharing
[4] Fee Claims [6] Payments of the bills
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Figure 2. Flow of Funds in the Japanese Health Care System 
 
    GHI includes workers employed by small and medium-sized companies. The 
insurer of GHI was the national government as of September 2008. The GHI 
received around 8.3 percent of the insured’s monthly income during the last two 
decades, evenly split between employer and employee. Because of regional 
differences in  respective health care expenditures, the participation of the 
prefectures, which are responsible for health care systems, is needed to control 
health care expenditures in a systematic manner. To promote prefectural 
integration, GHI became a public corporation of the Japan Health Insurance 
Association in October 2008. It is able to set premium rates that reflect the relevant 
health care expenditures of the different prefectures, as well as offer health services 
according to the actual situation in the respective region. In SHI, large firms 
organize their own insurance group. The contributions to SHI are income-related. It 
is set as a percentage of monthly remuneration. The legislation requires the 
contributions of employers and employees to be shared equally. The proportion of 
the share can be changed by agreement. Casual and Part-time employees and most 
of dispatched workers are excluded from society membership and have to be covered 
by the other type of public health insurance unless their working hours exceed three 
quarters of regular workers. Those individuals who are not enrolled through their - 5 - 
 
job must enroll in the NHI Program through the government office in the city, town, 
or village in which they live. Insures are linked to a person’s employer, occupation, 
or geographic location, and each insurer operates a different scheme. People are 
assigned to one or other scheme depending on their occupation or place of residence.   
 







Note: The arrow implies that the transition of the elderly from NHI to Long life medical care system.
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Table 1 shows that the outline of the health insurance system in Japan. For 
simplicity, it excludes SI. The rate of subscribers in NHI is almost 40 percent (the - 6 - 
 
highest) and the rate of government subsidy for municipalities is almost 43 percent 
of benefit costs.6
The NHI account is under financial pressure as most of the insured are elderly.  
NHI fiscal revenues are primarily derived from insurance premiums and the central 
government subsidy, although money is transferred from employer-based insurance 
to NHI to help cover the costs of retired employees. The focus of reforming health 
insurance for the elderly is always to provide appropriate nursing and care services, 
as well as health services, and ensure the long-term stability of the system (Fukawa 
2002).   
 
 
3 Empirical Analyses 
Imai (2002) argued that uneven geographical distribution of resources and 
treatments largely reflects different needs in different prefectures, because there 
are good correlations between need and access rates variously measured, i.e., 
doctors and beds per capita, consultations and admissions per capita, and health 
expenditure per capita if the crude mortality rate of each prefecture is taken as a 
proxy for the need for healthcare. 7
 
  In this section, we examine the regional 
differences in medical levies because previous studies have not revealed the 
income-related geographic inequality in medical levies.   
3-1. Data 
As the level of geographic aggregation influences the extent to which income 
inequalities exist, the choice of the level of analysis (country, state, county, urban 
versus rural, census tract, block level) will influence conclusions about the 
distribution of ill health (Starfield 2006). We use data for each municipality, 
because a local government basically calculates NHI premiums for a given year by 
estimating the expected cost of health care per member of the municipality. 
Insurance premiums are paid monthly under NHI. The per capita levy is reduced by 
70 percent or 50 percent when the insured person’s annual income falls below a 
specified amount. The maximum annual premium for medical insurance is about 
AU$6600 (AU$=80yen). 70 percent of medical treatment costs being paid by the 
NHI Program, with the remaining 30 percent paid by the insured. Copayment rate 
of persons under 3 years of age is 20 percent, and 10 percent or 30 percent for 
persons 70 years or older. 
                                                             
6  In 1982, the Health Care System for the Elderly (HCSE) was established. Elderly was defined as 
aged 70 and over in the 1990s. The definition of the elderly changed in the 2000s. Since October 2002, 
the minimum eligibility age has been increased by one year each year and continued to rise until it 
reached 75 in October 2007. Seniors aged 75 and older enrol in HCSE and receive benefits through 
contributions from other insurance plans. It is well known that one of the major causes of the financial 
difficulties of health insurers is the Contribution for the HCSE (Sienkin), which is imposed on insurers 
to finance the health care expenditures of the elderly.  
7  Good correlations among health variables do not imply horizontal equity in health. Kumagai (2009) 
investigated the relationships among the need for inpatient care, the amount of inpatient care services 
provided, and money transfers to Japanese municipal hospitals in the Kansai region from the 
viewpoint of vertical equity. It was found that allotments (municipal subsidy) showed vertical inequity 
in the number of inpatients per day after taking into account the overall social welfare regarding the 
distribution of allotments. - 7 - 
 
A portion of health care costs is levied on the tax base as medical insurance. 
Income levy is determined according to household income.8  Asset levy is excluded 
in many large cities and per-household levy is excluded in some cities. In such a 
setting, contribution rates are fixed by law, and the risk profile and per capita 
revenue depend on the profile of the scheme’s members.9
 
  It is highly likely in this 
scenario that the benefit package differs across schemes, with low-income high-risk 
schemes being unable to offer a very generous package, and high-income low-risk 
schemes being able to offer a more generous package (Wagstaff 2009). 
National Health Insurance Premium=Medical Insurance + Long-term 
(Nursing) Care Insurance 
 
Medical Insurance = Income Levy (or Taxes from income) + Asset Levy (or 
Taxes from fixed asset) + Poll taxes 
 
Poll taxes=Per-Capita Levy (insured persons) + Per-Household Levy 
 
Table 2. Characteristics of Health Variables 
Kansai SMRs Income Medical Levies Kanto SMRs Income Medical Levies
Osaka 101.7 833353.1 156042.6 Tokyo 96.9 825167.2 122485.2
(11.7) (114551.4) (12851.8) (16.5) (246000.1) (16433.9)
Hyogo 100.4 651898.6 137437.4 Kanagawa 97.7 858481.3 156147.8
(7.5) (142691.7) (15604.4) (11.8) (163492.4) (15697.2)
Nara 99.9 567091.6 129882.8 Saitama 100.6 907080.8 152051.6
(9.2) (168517.3) (24506.6) (8.9) (188168.9) (20014.9)
Kyoto 97.1 639306.3 130340.8 Chiba 102.4 927352.8 163586.8
(10.7) (178314.1) (21246.5) (9.2) (181362.9) (19061.3)
Total 100.0 679869.5 139591.0 Total 99.6 882762.2 147632.9
(9.9) (180529.2) (21515.7) (12.0) (203488.1) (24144.2)  
Note: Standard deviations are shown in the parentheses. 
 
Data of the central two regions of the Japanese National Health Insurance in 
2005 were extracted. The total number of municipalities in the central Kansai was 
149 (Osaka 43, Hyogo 41, Nara 39, and Kyoto 26) and the total population was 
about 18.48 million (Osaka 8.82, Hyogo 5.59, Nara 1.42, and Kyoto 2.65). Their 
share of municipalities was about 8.2 percent and their share of population was 
about 14.5 percent in the end of FY2005. The total number of municipalities in the 
central Kanto was 223 (Tokyo 62, Kanagawa 35, Saitama 70, and Chiba 56) and the 
total population was about 34.48 million (Tokyo 12.57, Kanagawa 8.79, Saitama 
7.05, and Chiba 6.06). Their share of municipalities was about 12.3 percent and 
their share of population was about 27.0 percent in the end of FY2005. 
Table 2 summarizes both mean and standard deviation of health variables in 
the central two regions. We can read the difference in male’ Standardized Mortality 
                                                             
8  If a portion of health care costs were levied as medical insurance, the burden of medical insurance 
would be regressive to lower income people. This requires a reduction of the per capita levy.  
9  By 2008, about 21% of households that were covered by NHI failed to pay the premium. It is 
important to reduce this share by improving compliance. - 8 - 
 
Ratios (SMRs) among prefectures and must doubt that wealthier is healthier 
because a higher income does not necessarily imply lower need for health care. It is 
noted that the standard deviation of medical levies in Nara prefecture was the 
largest and the magnitude was about 18.9 percent of the mean. Medical levies in 
Nara prefecture have a heavy-tailed distribution. 
Income per household (actual taxable income per household) was used as the 
living standards variable and male’ SMRs as the representative indicator of the 
need for health care of the elderly. The variance of male’ SMRs is larger than that of 
female’ SMRs. Actual taxable income per household is derived from Equation 1. 
This calculation is basically after the procedure of Kadota et al. (1989). It is noted 
that medical levy  per household in Equation  1 includes the unpaid rate of 
contribution to NHI in each municipality. The existence of this variable differs from 
Kadota  et al.  (1989). The medical levy  per household is the product of the 
assessment based on income per household and the inverse of (1－unpaid rate). The 
multiplier of income levy  is the ratio of assessment based on income to total 
assessment. 
 
Income per household 
＝medical levy per household × the multiplier of income levy  
／income tax rate × the  number  of  households                         (1) 
 
Unpaid rate= the amount of unpaid levies / total medical levies in the previous 
period 
 
Each insurer operates different schemes and has a different income tax rate. 
However, some of the series of income tax rates are rectified when municipalities 
merged and a proxy variable does not exist. Therefore, income tax rate in all 
municipalities is 0.1, which is considered to be in the neighborhood of the mean 
income tax rate. For the municipalities merged in 2005, we cannot make weighted 
series of the multiplier of income levies because the series of the number of 
households in previous municipalities are  not publicly reported. We used the 
multiplier of income levy of the municipality with the largest insured households in 
the previous region as the representative variable of the municipality merged. 
 
3-2. Geographic Decomposition of the Concentration Index 
 
Lower income groups generally have poorer health status and therefore higher 
needs for health care. We expect medical levies are concentrated more among the 
poor households. These inequalities can be measured using the concentration index, 
equal to twice the area between the line of equality and the concentration curve (See 
Figure 3, L(s)). A concentration curve plots the cumulative proportion of the health 
variable in question against the cumulative proportion of the population (from low 
income to high income). The health concentration index is defined as twice the area 
between the concentration curve and the diagonal, and is bounded by -1 and 1. The 
larger the index is in the absolute size, the greater the degree of inequality. When it 
is negative, it indicates that health variable in question is concentrated more among 
the poor (pro-poor inequality). When it is positive, it indicates pro-rich inequality. 
We examine the regional disparities in medical levies to health insurers 
contributing to income-related inequalities in health care financing. Following - 9 - 
 
Wagstaff (2005), we can write Equation 2 by analogy with the geographic 
decomposition. 
 
R C C C
N
i
i i B + + = ∑
=1
α                                              (2) 
 
where  C   is the concentration index calculated on the full sample,  B C   is the 
between-areas concentration index.  i α   is the ith area’s population share,  i C   is 
the concentration index of the ith    area, and R   is a reranking term.10
B C     is 
computed by assigning all households in a given area the mean value of health 
variable in that area, lining up areas by their mean per household income, and 
computing the corresponding concentration index for health variable.  i C   indicates 
the extent of income-related inequality in health variable in  ith area. The weighted 
sum of these N concentration indices captures the fact that within areas the poor 
systematically have smaller or larger values of health variable.  
Because the magnitude of  R   depends on both the extent of reranking in the 
move from within-area concentration curve to the concentration curve of health 
variable in question and the size of the covariance between income and heath 
variable,  R   is a mixture of  within-area and between-area income-related 
inequality in health variable. 
 
 
Figure 3. Concentration Curve 
 
Both  i h   and  i b   in Equation 3 are variables concerned when we analyze the 
inequality in health care financing. When  i h   is medical levy per household and  i b  
is income per household, the OLS estimate of β   in Equation 3  represents the 









+ + = − β δ σ ] [ 2 * *
2                                        (3) 
                                                             
10  We do not take into account the share of health variable such as the  i th area’s physician share. - 10 - 
 
 
where  i R   the fractional rank by income per household, 
2
R σ   its variance, δ   the 
constant term,  i u   error term, 
* h   the mean of  i h   and 
* b   the mean of  i b .   
Table  3  summarizes  the results of geographic decomposition of the health 
concentration index.  Table  4  shows  the  estimates of within-area inequality in 
health and health care financing. They are Newey-West estimates that modified the 
serial correlation in Equation 3 (Wagstaff and Doorslaer 2000). The value of  C of 
-0.086 in Table 3 indicates that there were subject to a pro-poor distribution of 
health care financing in the central Kansai. In the central Kanto, there were subject 
to a pro-poor distribution of health care financing, too. Table 3 implies that the 
within-area inequality in medical levies mainly accounted for geographic inequality 
in medical levies per household (0.837=0.072/0.086, 1.253=0.089/0.071). For both 
regions, the hypothesis that there was no between-area inequality in medical levies 
was not rejected. The difference in sign of  R   was caused by  the extent of the 
inequality in the prefecture with the largest proportion of households. By 
comparison between the estimates of Osaka prefecture and that of Tokyo metropolis, 
we can confirm it (See Table 4, Ins-I). 
 
Table 3. Geographic Decomposition of the Health Concentration Index 
Kansai Needs-I Ins-I Kanto Needs-I Ins-I
C -0.160 -0.086 C -0.141 -0.071
(-16.28) (-23.90) (-14.71) (-11.32)
αiCi -0.115 -0.072 αiCi -0.152 -0.089
CB 0.065 0.029 CB -0.018 0.033
(1.36) (0.98) (-4.82) (1.08)
R -0.045 -0.014 R 0.029 0.018  
Note: T-values are in the parentheses. ‘Ins’ means medical levies per household. 
 
Table 4. Within-Area Inequality in Health and Health Care Financing  
Household Proportion Needs-I Ins-I
Kansai
Osaka 1810306 0.498 -0.069 -0.060
Hyogo 1080479 0.297 -0.141 -0.085
Nara 256252 0.070 -0.191 -0.079
Kyoto 488441 0.134 -0.188 -0.082
Kanto
Tokyo 2868114 0.409 -0.187 -0.104
Kanagawa 1671962 0.239 -0.122 -0.100
Saitama 1298529 0.185 -0.140 -0.056
Chiba 1169440 0.167 -0.122 -0.075  
Note: ‘Ins’ means medical levies per household. All estimates are statistically significant. 
 - 11 - 
 
We can find the value of 0.048 of the differences in the within-area inequality in 
medical levies in the central Kanto.11  On the contrary, there were little differences 
in the within-area inequality in medical levies in the central Kansai although there 
were large differences in the within-area inequality in health (See Table4, Needs-I). 
It can be considered that the following two factors caused the differences in the 
within-area inequality in health care financing. First, there are large differences in 
inequality in income per household among prefectures. Table 5 shows that the 
inequality in income per household in Tokyo metropolis was the largest.12
Table 5 also presents that the regional differences in the inequality in medical 
levies per household  were mainly derived from income-related inequality per 
household. However, we should notice that the proportion of the inequality in the 
inverse of the multiplier of income levies to the inequality in medical levies per 
household  (B/A). We can see that the proportion in Nara prefecture was the 
smallest among the eight prefectures. It may indicate that the inequality in the 
multiplier of income levies in Nara prefecture was the largest. Nara prefecture does 
not have large city and the proportion of households whose payment of premium 
was reduced in Nara prefecture is higher than that of the other prefectures. 
Increasing this proportion tends to decrease the multiplier of income levy.   
  Second, 
the multiplier of income levies in the central Kanto is relatively higher than that of 
the central Kansai. The weighted average of the multiplier of income levies in the 
central Kanto and that in the central Kansai are 0.661 and 0.578, respectively. The 
number of households was used as the weight variable.  
 
Table 5. Inequality in Medical Levies 
Osaka Hyogo Nara Kyoto
Medical levies per household (A) 0.003 0.006 0.021 0.014
Income per household 1.712 1.396 0.942 0.851
The inverse of the multiplier of
income levies (B) 0.003 0.014 0.011 0.014
B/A 1.0 2.2 0.5 1.0
Tokyo Kanagawa Saitama Chiba
Medical levies per household (A) 0.009 0.005 0.008 0.006
Income per household 2.043 0.973 0.815 0.655
The inverse of the multiplier of
income levies (B) 0.024 0.020 0.008 0.014
B/A 2.6 4.1 0.9 2.1
 
 
When we examine the inequality in the multiplier of income levies, land price 
should be taken into consideration. Because the coefficients of correlation between 
                                                             
11  There were regional differences in medical levies to health insurers from the view point of 
geographic inequality. This means such proportionality was not built into the NHI system through 
near constant contribution rates across the distribution of living standards.  
12  Following the procedure of Cheng and Li (2006), a decomposition of medical levies was conducted. 
We obtain the following relationship;  Inequality in medical levies ＝  Inequality in income per 
household + Inequality in the inverse of the multiplier of income levies + Residual.  
Theil’s criterion is composed of  i n weight of the region,  µ   mean of medical levies and  i z   medical 
levies of ith region. Democratic weight (
N








) ln( ) (
µ  - 12 - 
 
the multiplier of the asset levies and the multiplier of income levies were negative 
except Chiba prefecture, we use the data of the standard land price of residential 
districts in each region to analyze the determinants of the multiplier of income 
levies.13  The standard land prices of residential districts were not publicly reported 
in some municipalities in 2005. We can use the data of 288 districts from the Survey 
of Land Price by Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport.14
By Weighted Least Squares regression for correcting the heteroscedasticity, we 
estimated three regression equations. The results of estimation are summarized in 
Table 6. As the results of Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test, we could not reject the null 
hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity at the 5 percent significance level. This implies 
that the standard errors of the parameter estimates were correct.
   
15
 
  For type A and 
type B equations, the natural logarithm of the number of the households was used 
as the weight variable. For type C equation, the natural logarithm of the number of 
the enrolment rate of NHI was used as the weight variable. Dependent variable is 
the natural logarithm of the multiplier of income levies.   
Table 6. Determinants of the Multiplier of Income levies 
 
ln(Multiplier of Income Levies) A B C
Intercept -5.84 -6.28 -5.72
(-15.84) (-17.11) (-14.36)




1/ln(Land Price) -10.91 -10.58 -7.85
(-12.85) (-12.26) (-8.07)
ln(Income) 0.47 0.50 0.48
(19.97) (19.39) (21.16)





Probability F-statistic [BPG]  0.053 0.074 0.481
Note) Weight: ln(Number of Households) [A][B], ln(Enrolment rate of NHI) [C]
BPG: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test (Heteroscedasticity test)
0.792 0.796 Adjusted R2 0.803
 
 
Table 6 shows that the elasticity of income per household was almost the same 
among three equations and the fitness of type C equation is slightly better than the 
other equations. Using  the quadratic  term of the number of households, type C 
equation  explained  the effect of the  increase in the number of households.  We 
therefore give an economic interpretation on type C equation.  The  quadratic 
                                                             
13  The coefficients of correlation between the two variables were less than -0.7 in prefectures with 
large population (Tokyo -0.72, Osaka -0.75). 
14  We could not obtain the data of all 43 municipalities in Osaka prefecture. 
15  We reject the hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity if the independent variables are jointly significant. - 13 - 
 
function of the number of households took the minimum value where the natural 
logarithm of the number of households was 8.455, which locates in the lower 30 
percent of the distribution of 288 districts.16
The series of the multiplier of income levies were inverse proportional to the 
standard land prices of residential districts.  The elasticity of the inverse of the 
standard land price is less than -7. The estimate indicates that the higher land price 
tends to greater the multiplier of income levies.   
  It suggests that the expansion of 
insurer’s size increases the multiplier of income levies in most of districts. 
It  was  found that the size  of  an  insurer and the standard land price of 
residential districts are major determinants of the multiplier of income levies. In a 
prefecture where the inequality in the multiplier of income levies is large, what 
local governments  should do?  If  local governments  raise per-household levy in 
proportion to the size of an insurer and lower the multiplier of income levy, the 
inequality in the multiplier of income levies will reduce. On the contrary, if local 
governments  aim to reduce the regional  differences in contribution rates of  the 
insured, they should introduce the transfer system from the high-income low-risk 
schemes to the low-income high-risk schemes.   
 
4 Conclusions 
This paper investigated whether the regional disparities in medical levies per 
household made a contribution to income-related geographic inequalities in health 
care financing. Data of the central two regions of the Japanese National Health 
Insurance in 2005 were extracted. Their share of municipalities was about 20.5 
percent and their share of population was about 41.5 percent in the end of FY2005. 
Retired employees and self-employed individuals are covered by this insurance 
system.   
We conducted the geographic decomposition using the concentration index. The 
within-area inequality in medical levies mainly accounted for geographic inequality 
in medical levies per household. For both regions, the hypothesis that there was no 
between-area inequality in medical levies was not rejected. We  revealed  the 
differences in the within-area inequality in medical levies in the central Kanto. This 
means such proportionality was not built into the NHI system through near 
constant contribution rates across the distribution of living standards. It can be 
considered that the differences in the within-area inequality were caused by the 
inequality in income per household and the multiplier of income levies. 
Because the coefficients of correlation between the multiplier of the asset levies 
and the multiplier of income levies were negative except Chiba prefecture, we used 
the data of the standard land price of residential districts in each region. As the 
results of the estimation by Weighted Least Squares regression, we found that the 
standard land price of residential districts and the size of an insurer are major 
determinants  of  the multiplier of income levies.  The higher land price tends to 
greater the multiplier of income levies. The expansion of insurer’s size increases the 
multiplier of income levies in most of districts. The inequality in the multiplier of 
income levies  will reduce if local governments  raise per-household levy in 
proportion to the size of an insurer and lower the multiplier of income levy.  
 
                                                             
16  Exp  (ln8.455)  =4697.  Mean  and median of the number of households  were 27566 and 11337, 
respectively. - 14 - 
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